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The Federal Judiciary: America's Recently
Liberated Minority
RANDALL BRIDWELL*

May we thrust aside the
dead hand of Earl Warren?
M.J. Sobran, Jr.**
This essay acts as an introductionto the two articles that follow:
Secretary Harris' address to the Fellows of the American Bar
Foundationand ProfessorRaoul Berger'sresponse to that address
represent opposing positions on the interpretationof the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution in its role of providing
protectionfor minorities. In addition,however, these articlesare
indicative of a fundamental disagreement between constitutional
law scholars regardingthe relationship between the Constitution
and the power of the judiciary. It is the last point that Professor
Bridwell addresses.
One of the most important current issues in American constitutional law concerns the requirement of a constitutional foundation or justification for judicial action, especially for judicial action that is not rooted in any particular provision of the Constitution, or is arguably contrary to the "meaning" of particular provisions.' This problem arises when judicial action goes outside of
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B., Midwestern
University, 1967; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1970; LL.M., Harvard University,

1971.
** Sobran, Taking the Fourteenth,30 NAT'L Ray. 283, 284 (1978).
1. The "meaning" of particular constitutional provisions referred to in this essay
should be taken not as a reference to any technical or scientific semantic elaboration of
the constitutional text. Instead, it should be viewed as referring to the variety of ways in
which the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, relates its decisions to the
Constitution for purposes of distinguishing their judicial function under the Constitution
from a purely discretionary command. See generally Wofford, The Blinding Light: The
Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation,31 U. Cm. L. REv. 502 (1964).
Most of the specific provisions in the Constitution fall considerably short of being selfexecuting statements directed precisely to the problem or dispute under consideration by
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the finite and determinable bounds2 of the Constitution that have
been legitimatized by majoritarian consent, that is, by the vote
of the population at large. 3 The question is whether the majoritarian pronouncements embodied in the Constitution can be reconciled with these Supreme Court decisions that do not rely upon
any particular constitutional authorization-decisions that
the modern Court. Some attempt is usually made to provide a constitutional justification
for what the Court does. Raoul Berger searches for some guiding "intent" of the framers
of any given provision, as illustrated in his GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1978); similarly, Joseph Story represents another
traditional approach to generate principled and defensible extrapolations from the text
by applying some definite and uniform technique of construction. See 1 J. STORY, ComMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 282-325 (3d ed. 1858). This is
generally felt necessary because of the almost universally accepted importance of consent
as a prerequisite to valid and binding rules of constitutional (or other) laws-because of
the primacy of democratic theory in our constitutional scheme. Thus, as one writer aptly
remarked:
When the rule applied by a court in the exercise of judicial review can be
persuasively demonstrated in a reasoned, principled way to derive from the
Constitution, and not from judges' values and policy preferences of the sort
appropriate to legislative judgment, the morality of consent is not contravened,
even though the will of an electoral majority, as expresed through a legislative
majority, is set aside.
Holland, American Liberals and JudicialActivism: Alexander Bickel's Appeal from the
New to the Old, 51 IND. L. J. 1025, 1042 (1976). It is in response to that requirement that
the task of using the Constitution to resolve an evolving series of novel problems has been
furthered by the common-law tradition, which dictates there must of necessity be much
recourse to analogizing and extrapolation in order to close the gap between a pertinent
constitutional text and a rule of decision purportedly derived therefrom. Id. The elaborate
decisional techniques of the common-law process, however, are in sharp contrast to the
often experimental method by which doubtful or debatable policy choices are made
through a legislative process, since the common law is, among other things, "confined
through presumptive adherence to precedent and commitment to a course of principled
development." Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91
HARv. L. REv. 1117, 1132 (1978). See R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OFTHE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM
11-34 (1977). For the variety of techniques used by the Court to shape constitutional law
in a manner faithful to the democratic tenets of the Constitution, see P. BREST, PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 47-87, 102-71 (1975).
2. The belief that the bounds of the Constitution are determined by reference to the
framers' intent is basic to Mr. Berger's approach. "More accurately, I hold that if the
intention is clear, it governs." Berger, Academe vs. the FoundingFathers, 30 NAT'L REV.
468 (1978). The result is that the Court is to a large extent excluded from the role of policymaking and is confined to an implementation of the framers' intent. See R. BERGER, supra
note 1, at 300 n.1.
3. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORAIrrY OF CONSENT (1975), and Holland, supra
note 1, for an excellent analytical review of this book. Even the advocates of the most
extensive sort of judicial power recognize the basic concern of those committed to a limited
form of judicial review of the text of the Constitution that is tied to a majoritarian or
democratic political theory. See Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1206 (1978).
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amount to obligatory commands of a small group of nonelected
officials.4
The two essays that follow illustrate divergent approaches in
the constitutional dialogue that has developed in response to this
question. The basic difference between the positions taken by

Professor Berger and Secretary Harris does not rest upon decisional technique or a difference of opinion on how the requirement of majoritarian consent should be met, but rather upon a
difference of opinion on whether it is necessary to speak in majoritarian; consent-oriented terms at all. Professor Berger is of the
school that cannot tolerate action without constitutional authorization or its equivalent, majoritarian enactments.5 He looks
only to the Constitution and its legislative history to determine
the extent of the judiciary's power and relies upon the will of the
majority thus expressed for the content of constitutional rules,
including those protecting minorities. Professor Berger assumes
that the Constitution has a limited meaning and is addressed to
particular problems; to him it is not a license to resolve judicially
all problems or issues generically alike or analogous to those
treated in the document itself.'
Secretary Harris' camp treats the judicial power exercised by
the Supreme Court as largely self-defined and discretionary,
without any meaningful limitations derived from the Constitution itself. Scholarly justifications for this type of unlimited authority are various. One position holds that a general "commonlaw" authority exists that differs from ordinary constitutional law
or conventional judicial review and endows the Court with a
broad rule-making power not tied to the Constitution.' Another
4. This theme is at once the most engrossing and the most perdurable of
that strand of political philosophy that goes under the rubric of constitutionalism-how to reconcile with the central premise of popular self-government a
scheme of constitutional adjudication which to a greater or lesser degree tends
to displace elected representatives in the resolution of questions of moral value
and policy preference.
Holland, supra note 1, at 1032.
5. See Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 908-10.
6. For Berger, to go beyond the limited goals that may be attributed to the Constitution through a search for the intent of the framers "is to substitute wishful thinking for
historical fact." Berger, The FourteenthAmendment: The Framers' Design, 30 S.C.L.
Rav. 495, 503 (1979).
7. The debates about the integration of the common-law system with our form of
constitution are as old as the Republic. As one earlier commentator remarked,
In other words, the inquiry is, whether the Federal Courts have a right
independent of the people of the United States or their representatives, by virtue
of some occult power supposed to be derived from the common law, to mould
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the Constitution as they please, and to extend their own jurisdiction beyond the
limits preserved by the national compact?
P. Du PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE
CouRTs OF rHE UNITED STATES vi (1824). Du Ponceau distinguished between different
theories of the common law, rejecting the notion of unlimited discretionary authority to
fashion rules for any case brought that satisfied the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Du Ponceau rejected any extra-constitutional common-law power, sharply
distinguishing between "jurisdiction of" the common law, which implied some preexisting legal principle of decision attributable to the Constitution with which the court
could resolve a case, and "jurisdiction from" the common law, which implied "a power
in direct opposition to the letter and spirit of our national charter" because it characterized "the common law" as a judicial decisional function guided only by the court's discretion. Id. at vi-vii. See R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrm, supra note 1, at 11-33. Indeed some of
the most hotly contested issues in our early legal history concerned the courts' commonlaw power. Id. at 35-98. Unfortunately, most of the modern commentary that seeks to base
extensive judicial policy-making power upon the common-law system itself is ahistorical
and tacitly accepts a theory of the common law that was rejected during the early national
period. It also uncritically characterizes the common-law rules of the Supreme Court as
the discretionary implementation of "subconstitutional policy concerns." Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. Rv.
1, 28 (1975). Indeed, rather than exploring the various meanings attached to the term
"common law," Monaghan merely assumes that it signifies only some discretionary decisionmaking by a court, rather than any technique of elaborating rules of decision within
the limits of particular textual or precedential restraints. "The more a rule is perceived
to rest upon debatable policy choices or uncertain empirical foundations, the more likely
it will be seen to be common law." Id. at 34. In an important article that attempts to
reassert a legislative classification for debatable policy choices, Professors Thomas
Schrock and Robert C. Welsh sharply assail Monaghan's a priori assumption that the
"common law" is a mere rationalization for judicial action and justly point out the implications of "subconstitutional" common-law judicial power for supposed constitutional
limitations on it. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 1, at 1120, 1132. They articulate a different
and more traditional definition for common-law authority that distinguishes it from legislative or policy-making functions and emphasizes the basic result orientation of the advocates of the "occult power" version of common-law authority. Id. at 1150. In their blunt
critique of Monaghan, these authors underscore the pathological traits of much of the
modern constitutional law commentary, a critique that aptly applies to the approach
taken by Secretary Harris in her essay with its belief in the self-evident rightness of the
course of action pursued by an activist court. Schrock and Welsh also identify other
features of this school of thought: the inability to resolve questions of authority essential
to majoritarian theory, id. at 1126; the simplified characterization of judicial action (i.e.,
the "common law"), id. at 1132; the failure to distinguish the type of authority they
advocate, such as "subconstitutional" power, from other powers, such as "real" constitutional law, id. at 1146; the constant confusion of the question of competency with the
merits of an issue, id. at 1150; and the utilitarian assumption that the sole measure of
the Court's power is whether or not its efforts have been successful in implementing a
policy some regard as desirable, id. at 1121, 1125. See also Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of
ConstitutionalInterpretation,5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603 (1978).
It is interesting to note the degree to which even lower federal judges claim the right
to legislate, justifying that claim by mere assertion. For example, U.S. District Judge
Robert W. Hemphill is credited with stating that "one role he has faced several times on
the bench during the past two decades has been the need for the judiciary to take over
some of the legislativefunctions of government." The State, Jan. 7, 1979, § A, at 20, col.
1 (emphasis added). It would be interesting if an executive order from the state governor
decreed that the legislative and judicial branches have failed to adequately register the
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explanation locates the source of the Court's power in the Constitution, but only as it represents an historical occasion upon which
the judiciary and its powers sprang to birth; the authority of the
Court is said to be self-determined, rather than being limited by
any analytical or intellectual process of interpreting the original
document. Under this approach the Constitution is, technically
speaking, the source of judicial authority, but the power the
Court actually wields permits it to take its own purely
"normative judgments" and "transubstantiate" them into constitutional law, to borrow the ludicrously pretentious jargon common place in this camp.' As Justice Hans Linde has pointed out,
the advocates of this position typically equate the "role" of the
Supreme Court with its constitutional authority In the Harris
approach, quite often a number of commonplace and obvious
features of judicial decisionmaking are emphasized to the exclusion of all other components of judicial action: the recognition
that decision making entails judgment and discretion; the recognition that John Marshall's famous dictum in Marbury, which
depicts a literal comparison of the plain text of the Constitution
and challenged law,' 0 is overdrawn and not literally true; and the
recognition that Supreme Court decisions do, over time, reflect
the values and intellectual milieu of the Court. These and other
insights seemingly reinforce the "realist" interpretation of judicial action as only discretion that justifies itself by a patently
false ceremony. According to this theory, the Court's real primary
function is to actively propound and enforce whatever values and
priorities the Court perceives around it, refusing to bow to the
"dead hand" of the past."
will of the majority and that he would henceforth promulgate ordinances having the effect
of statutory law, or if the governor simply declared the courts ineffective at efficiently
resolving litigation (perhaps citing their expanded caseloads) so that it would be necessary
to hold a governor's court of general jurisdiction at stated times until the problem cleared
up.
8. Perry, supra note 3, at 1192 (identifies the Supreme Court's opinion in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), probably correctly, as the "Court's normative judgment transubstantiated into constitutional law."). Again, in confirmation of what Schrock and
Welsh call the "prescriptive realist" approach-i. e., the favoring of judicial policy-making
limited only by some unformed approval (presumably from the enlightened camp of
academe)-Perry acknowledges "metatextual" sources of the Court's rule-making power
such as "conventional morality." Id. at 1202.
9. "Characteristically, questions of constitutional law and questions of the role of the
Supreme Court are generally treated as the same thing." Linde, Judges, Critics, and the
Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972).
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803).
11. A particularly perfervid example of this orientation to the present is Miller, An
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Whether one argues that the Supreme Court has "extraconstitutional" powers (some would say "subconstitutional"
powers) or that its powers, though derived from the Constitution,
are defined only by the Supreme Court's discretion is to make a
distinction without a difference. The fundamental problem remains for those who insist on consent or majoritarian justification
for judicial commands." The essays that follow offer instructive
examples of two divergent approaches to this difficult problem.
They are interesting and important representatives of viewpoints
as philosophically opposed to each other as those that surrounded
the creation of the Constitution. This dialogue has been sparked
by the role of the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
as the focal point for a veritable storm of advocacy for activism
in nearly every conceivable direction." It would be impractical
here to essay all the various views represented in scholarship and
judicial opinion on this issue, but it is instructive to identify some
of the characteristics of these two approaches and of the literature
in general.
Many of the advocates of judicial activism proceed unencumbered by the burden of a constitutional theory that supports
the results they seek; they simply attempt to substitute in place
of constitutional theory an attractive and emotionally moving
Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the FoundingFathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separationof Powers, 27 ARK.L. RFv. 583 (1973). This article
exemplifies all the shopworn cliches that are used in favor of government action to cure
whatever ails us. They are declared with the nonanalytical, rhetorical exuberance that
has become the hallmark of the "prescriptive realist" or experimental, result-oriented
advocate of judicial reform. Id. at 590. In a farsighted prognosis preceeding the Nixon
debacle, the author laments the irreversible shift to executive hegemony, id. at 591, and
admonishes us to forget the past and grapple with our own peculiar "social flux" as best
we can. Id. at 585, 595. Oddly enough, a discussion of separation of powers is not to be
found in this article, despite its promising title.
12. Supposedly, some would prefer a democratic solution to our problems but tend
to accept, sometimes regretfully, the Court's new role as super-legislator because our
democratic institutions have allegedly failed. See A. Cox,

THE WARREN

COURT: CONSTru-

(1968). It has been pointed out, however,
that rare instances do exist in which a popular majority in possession of certain privileges-for example, the privilege of the franchise-has decided to extend those benefits
or privileges to a class excluded from them, and all without prodding from the Supreme
Court. For example, consider the fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-third,
twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth amendments, mentioned in Holland, supra note 1, at
1029 n.13. Some have also justified the Court's creative use of power to change the Constitution because the amendment process is so cumbersome and difficult. This, however,
would seem to be an equally good argument against unrestrained judicial rule-making at
the constitutional level because we will be hard pressed to gain relief from their decisions.
Some commentators have emphasized just this point. See 1 J. STORY, supra note 1, at 314.
13. Holland, supra note 1, at 1027 n.8.
TIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss3/2

6

Bridwell: The Federal Judiciary: Amercia's Recently Liberated Minority

1979]

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

rhetorical dress for what is actually a simple statement of desired
results." Average readers are often beguiled into thinking the
advocate is doing more than attempting to elicit support for a
favored result. They are led astray by the classification of this
literature as "constitutional law," charitably assuming that the
law journals' editorial standards have classified it within this
genre because some principle independent of the results was
being examined. Many interested readers would be offended by
the realization that only a policy debate over results is involved
in much constitutional law scholarship, and perhaps some would
be too embarrassed to conclude that they had been so far outside
the prevailing ideological fashion that they failed to realize that
a jargonized, result-oriented dialogue had largely replaced the
analytical device of separating principles from results. Actually,
however, many scholars have accepted the belief that any "analysis" of constitutional law is comprised solely of eliciting support
for results the Court has produced in particular cases or by
hypothesizing the terrible alternatives to result orientation. 5
When the Court has adopted a purely result-oriented approach,
a scholar's "analysis" of the Court's powers in functional, constitutional terms generally concludes that the sole measure of
the Court's authority to act is the success it achieves in promulgating and enforcing policy in a "frankly experimental" fashion."6 This constitutional analysis is curiously indistinguishable
from an evaluation of the results themselves. Thus, at least one
variety of constitutional scholarship exists that seeks to obtain a
favorable nose count on particular results or policy choices by
addressing an appeal to whatever group or clientele reads or is
influenced by the particular publication in question. Ironically,
the proponents of the variety of constitutional law that perceives
the judiciary as a forum for implementing policy choices scarcely
ever perceive their approach as a rather unique form of majoritarian politics. It is tempting to view this variety of scholarship
14. See Grey Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STA. L. REv. 703, 711-12
(1975), in which the argument favoring expansive judicial powers is structured around the
horrible results that will allegedly occur without it. This article vividly illustrates the
studied avoidance of any consideration of institutional competence by modem constitutional scholars. This feature is probably because of its almost exclusive preoccupation with
the desirable result that can be attained if authority and competence considerations are
dismissed. In a curious tautology, what passes for a defense of a particular form of judicial
power rests almost entirely upon the assumed advantage that would accrue to its existence. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 1, at 1150.
15. Grey, supra note 14.
16. Linde, supra note 9 at 228; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 1, at 1120-21.
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as a process of galvanizing support of a majority of a relatively
small, but possibly influential, component of the national community-legal scholars-around particular policies that emerge
from current judicial decisions. A peculiar hybrid form of majoritarian politics has thus been created. If constitutional scholarship has become largely a form of highly politicized journalism,
one would expect the relative merits of any particular contributor
to be measured by the avidity with which the writer declares
himself in sympathy with the prevailing fashion. In any case,
whether from detached analysis or merely from "voting" through
scholarly publications, the academic community has clearly
leaned toward a form of utilitarian policy analysis generally favoring judicial activism. "Legal realism" and the conviction that
courts are primarily a forum for policy debates has become "the
common core of tradition shared by most scholarship and appellate judging today."'" Thus, the primarily result-oriented form of
constitutional scholarship simply fails to address the issue of majority rule.
An occasional attempt is made, however, to ground these
evolving policy choices made by the courts in some type of formal
majoritarian process.' 8 These attempts are plagued by the formidable problems that accompany harmonizing the concept of judicial action as unfettered but enlightened policy choices with the
traditional majoritarian or democratic justification of judicial
action. The failure to deal with this issue, however, tends to confirm the qualms felt by some over the nondemocratic nature of a
growing body of "constitutional" rules. Inconvenient questions
immediately arise and multiply once consent as a basis for these
rules is taken too seriously by scholars whose primary concern is
with results. For example, can a majoritarian statement of constitutional law embodied in an amendment to the Constitution'9 be
overridden by formally different majoritarian "expression of dis17. Linde, supra note 9, at 227.
18. Perry, supra note 3, at 1233-35.
19. It is critical to Mr. Berger's thesis, fully developed in his recent book, that the
fourteenth amendment created only particular and limited protections for minorities and
that this protection excluded the subjects of voting and school desegregation. See Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 909-11. For a fuller account of the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment (in addition to Professor Berger's book, supra note 1), see H.
BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1901); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).

(1908); H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE
Additionally, for some further comments by Professor

Berger in response to recent reviews, see Berger, Response: Government by Judiciary:
Some Countercriticism, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1125 (1978).
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satisfaction" with what was originally adopted?'" Presumably

the court is permitted to divine this majoritarian rejection of a
previously approved rule in the litigation process and relieve us
of its effect. But what standards do they employ in discerning
sufficiently broad and intensely felt majority dissatisfaction with
what was previously put in the Constitution? Moreover, if the
case before them concerns the protection of a minority group or
a member thereof, must not the protection or assistance the Court
affords be by definition in spite of expressed majority values? If
it is, must it not then be justified by some previous majoritarian
statement such as a constitutional provision or amendment? If
majoritarian premises are scrupulously maintained, then a further admission seems to be required that the actual content of the
previously created majoritarian concessions to the minority is
somehow limited and determinable, and is thus tied to the Constitution itself. Another possibility is to resort to the democratic
process to define those concessions, rather than to resort to some
roving judicial commission to protect minorities against majorities in all cases. 1 Unless some action like this is taken, the Court's
actions would consistently obstruct rather than vindicate majority will. Of course, these questions will only be raised if majoritarian consent is felt to be required for judicial action. The alleged ongoing power to judicially revise previous majoritarian
expressions in light of current ones seems inconsistent, however,
with identifying the Constitution as the source of constitutional
protection for minorities. If majoritarian justification for the com20. One theme within the pro-activist or apologetic school of constitutional scholarship tends not only to justify the Supreme Court's foray into policy-making in resultoriented terms, but also to add the additional justification that the normal democratic
processes, like the state legislatures, had simply "failed to adapt" to changing social
conditions and problems. See A. Cox, supra note 12, at 115-16. The technique of apologizing for judicial reform in result or policy terms has often been recognized as directly
implicating the traditional theory of a separation of powers, in that debatable policy
choices are generally allocated to the legislative branch in our democratic constitutional
system. As Professor Holland observed: "To some it might seem odd that a scholarly
justification for the Court's more than occasional failure to observe the limitations which
differentiate the functions of adjudication from legislation should rest upon consideration
wholly applicable to the latter." Holland, supra note 1, at 1028 n.9.
21. Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399
(1978). In his discussion of constraints on the "utilitarian morality" under which majority
decisions may affect a minority, Professor Ely rejects unfettered judicial discretion to
formulate antimajoritarian principles out of some prevalent judicial philosophy that
might determine the content of those principles: "Even assuming further side constraints
on a utilitarian morality are appropriate, their content should be determined, I shall
argue, by the democratic process rather than in accord with a philosophical system one
or more commentators may find appealing." Id. at 406 n.29.
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mands of the Supreme Court is a serious goal, then some limited,
definable content to the constitutional provisions for the protection of minorities or some limited form of judicial decisionmaking must be sought. In addition, it must logically be a content to some extent immune from overt judicial revision if the
protection is to be meaningful, lest today's perceived majority
bent on discrimination find support in a court willing to overlook
particular express constitutional guarantees created in the past.
The dead hand of Earl Warren may be as easily thrust aside as
that of Rufus Peckham. If majoritarianism in some form is to
continue as a basis for our constitutional law, then there is little
room for the position that the Supreme Court must as a matter
of constitutional imperative vindicate any identifiable minority
against all majority action. To allow such a position, we would
have to interpret our constitutional history as the spectacle of a
people whose actions are theoretically sanctioned by majoritarian
consent, using their authority to destroy themselves by forever
disabling them from taking a position contrary to any minority
interest.
Suffice it to say that these quandaries result largely from the
efforts of constitutional law literature to harmonize equivocally
result orientation with a democratic theory of law and to equate
the "role" of the Court with its constitutional powers. Most writers to date have been pitched between two problematical extremes in dealing with this problem: (1) an approach that is
almost totally impressionistic, ahistorical, nonanalytical, polemical, journalistic, and, which is designed to promote "popular"
judicial action; and (2) a preoccupation with rendering one component in the overall process of constitutional interpretation-such as the framers' intent-into a hypertechnical and possibly exclusive guide to constitutional law. The literature has
employed various designations to roughly distinguish these two
basic divisions, though numerous minor "differences do exist
within each group. Some prefer to distinguish between the apologist for and the critics of our new judicial authority by referring
to the former as "noninterpretivists" and the latter as
"interpretivists;" 22 some designating the former as "prescriptive
realists" and the latter as proponents of "interpretive judicial
review";23 some calling the one a "functional" approach and the
22. Ely, supra note 21.
23. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 1 at 1172.
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other a "textual" approach. 4 Whatever nomenclature one prefers, general features that typify those two opposed positions can
be readily identified in the following essays.
Secretary Harris' impressionistic reaction to the Constitution suggests that perpetual unlimited minority vindication is a
fundamental, perhaps the fundamental, axiom of constitutional
law. She shrugs off the consensual problem and the problem of
defining constitutional content by emphasizing highly general
features that she deems essential to the Constitution; she discerns
not so much particular principles as pervasive trends, such as the
concern for minority rights. She also alleges that the primary
concern of certain important figures in the development of our
Constitution was minority rights and that this paramount objective had become a constitutional imperative.2s Another element
of her interpretation of the Constitution is the characterization of
the meaning of some constitutional provisions as "open-ended""5
or "open-textured" ' as a justification for a broad interpretation
of their purpose. These provisions are construed as being so openended that they arguably support whatever interpretation the
judiciary makes of them.2s In this respect, the provisions are not
24. Perry, supra note 3, at 1203, 1206; see also Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REv.
684 (1978).
25. Harris, Address to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation,Midyear Meeting
in New Orleans (Feb. 1977), reprinted in 30 S.C.L. Rav. 485, 486 (1979).
26. Alexander Bickel is credited with first advancing this feature of the language of
the fourteenth amendment as a justification for its recent interpretations. R. BERGER,

supra note 1, at 99.
27. Ely, supra note 21, at 414-15.
28. Referring to the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
Professor Ely observes that "the invitation apparently extended by the clause is frightening." Id. at 425. Significantly, this and other portions of the fourteenth amendment are
viewed by Professor Berger as having a clear historically determined content. R. BERGER,
supra note 1, at 3-10. See Ely, supra note 21, at 433-35 nn. 128 & 129 for Professor Ely's
criticism of Berger's methods of construing the amendment's hisfory and determining the
framers' intent. Occasionally a scholar will venture a critique of the reliance on framers'
intent as an exclusive tool of constitutional interpretation, but normally the criticisms
employed amount to no more than a syllogistic assertion that the Constitution is more
important than mere statutes, which are traditionally subject to an "intent of the makers"
rule, and consequently the Constitution should not be subject to such a rule. See Alfange,
supra note 7, in which the author observes that "[i]n view of that critical characteristic,
it would not seem that the original intent of the framers of a constitution should be
accorded the same controlling effect given the intention of those who enact a statute."
Id. at 610 (emphasis added). Indeed, one may wonder how inescapable the conclusion
really is that a document "intended to endure for ages to come" should be less circumscribed by the meaning that its drafters seriously meant to give it than a statute that the
author regards as "ephemeral." Id. at 609. How minimization of the intended meaning of
utilized words enhances, rather than reduces, the longevity of the document in any but a
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made to speak to particular issues, such as reapportionment or
segregation, but to general goals, such as "equality" or the like
(Secretary Harris opts for general minority protection). Thus the
particular issues are made to appear as subcategories of larger
objectives and not as important as the objective itself. This would
permit judicial abolition of segregation under the banner of the
fourteenth amendment, even if previous generations (including
the framers) would not have given it that effect. The result can
be explained by way of determinist philosophy as the continued
unfolding of events compatible with the previously
stated-though imperfect and incomplete-attempt to promote
some general trend or objective.29 This approach will satisfy some
formalistic sense is not as crystal clear as most such writers assume. It is one weakness of
this analysis that comprehensive and sweeping statements about constitutional interpretation are based upon what "would seem" apparent to the analyst, but "would not seem"
apparent to many others. Resolution of an issue by an analytical apparatus that is entirely
impressionistic and that seeks to re-enforce one side of the debate merely by assuming
the answer to the issue a prioriand yet produces writing of considerable length is quite a
tribute to the science of extenuated literary embellishment and composition. Under the
rule that good things usually come in pairs, or perhaps bundles, this "analytical" technique is generally accompanied by the realist cliches about the "dead hand" and the
passage of time-thought to add some weight to the other a priori declarations. This
approach attempts to treat constitutional problems as if they involved only semantic
issues. For example, in discussing the Dred Scott case Alfange remarks:
Even assuming the validity of Chief Justice Taney's view of the intent of the
framers with regard to the word "citizens," why should the meaning of that word
not be allowed to change with the passage of time so that all persons who, in a
different generation, are looked upon as citizens can be considered as being
included within the scope of the word?
Id. at 113. It is submitted that the "either intent or escape from the dead hand of the past"
dialectic misses the real problems in this area. Justice Story, for example, also rejected
any literal theory of framers' intent, see 1 J. STORY, supra note 1, at 287-88, and asserted
that "[nlothing but the text was adopted by the people." Id. at 288. Yet Story clearly
believed that "[alrguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience ought here to be of
no weight" in constitutional interpretation. Id. at 303. Obviously Story had something
more in mind than treating constitutional questions as if they were identical to semantic
questions, i.e., whether the term "citizen" should be allowed to change with the passage
of time. The problems of constitutional interpretation implicate questions of institutional
competence and political philosophy that are not captured by a purely semantic analysis.
It is certainly possible that the framers' intent was in fact compatible with these semantic
insights and recognized the need for evolving applications of the language of the Constitution. Attempts to work out a system of interpretation that accommodates this intent and
the need for limits in judicial authority are more helpful, and more difficult, than this
semanticist's approach to the text. See Ely, supra note 21, at 413-18. In a manner similar
to Story's, Ely observes that "the most important datum bearing on what was intended
is the constitutional language itself." Id. at 418. Yet, in his analysis, he goes far beyond
an equation of constitutional interpretation with semantics. See also R. DwoPKIN, TAKING
RIoHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).

29. Harris, supra note 25, at 488. "I believe that the theory [of Professor Berger]
does not account for the overriding concern of the framers of the Constitution with the
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even if the currently mandated results are at odds with or contrary to a previously adopted constitutional provision, because of
the rationalization that the context in which the provisions operate changes with time.'" Secretary Harris attempts to align herself with this school of thought by observing that the founding
fathers were characteristically unable to transcend the time in
which they lived-much as we are-and adduces as proof the
curious example of President Washington suffering at the hands
of eighteenth century healers, whose techniques would be inconsistent with modem medical methods."1 It is always tempting to
wonder whether this argument is not totally demolished by puzzling whether we would behave as we do if we were transposed
into the eighteenth century, and knew precisely what the founding fathers knew.
Secretary Harris' essay exemplifies the pathological features
of one school of thought generally favoring the judicial action or
"activism" of recent years: she places great faith in the litigational process to solve complex social problems. 2 Her view of
constitutional issues emphasizes highly general, subjective, and
perhaps speculative themes in constitutional development, such
as her perception of a transcendent and overriding trend favoring the vindication of minority positions generally by an active
court.3 Her exigesis of the scope and function of the Constitution
is not mired in any historical detail and eschews precise or limited
protection of minorities." She also describes the focus on minority protection as "a pre-

cise and unanimous desire of the founding fathers." Id. Curiously, Secretary Harris
adduces as support for her "general spirit" theory: Alexander Hamilton, who would
"brook no possibility of rule by majority fiat," id. at 486; James Madison, who saw the
"need to form a nation in which the rights of minorities prevailed over any tyrannical

social policy the majority might wish to impose," id.; and Thomas Jefferson, who "had
he been present would have agreed with the need to protect the minority," id. Professor Berger takes issue with the accuracy of Secretary Harris' estimate about the primacy
of minority protection in the scheme of values of these examples of eighteenth century
liberalism, observing that not only did some of them appear to find less problems with

the mandate of the "rich and well born" than with the "mass of the people," Berger,
supra note 6, at 499, but also that some were slaveholders who were anxious to increase

the representational basis and hence the political power of the slaveholding section of the
country. As Berger remarks, "Madison is hardly the man to cite for protection of the black

minority." Id.
30. See Miller, supra note 11, at 595-97, for some superb examples of presentist

rhetoric cum constitutional scholarship.
31. Harris, supra note 25, at 492.
32. As she observes, "The fact that major social conflicts can be resolved by the legal

process is a crucial accomplishment for this nation." Id. at 492; Schrock & Welsh, supra
note 1, at 1151; Holland, supra note 1, at 1127.
33. See note 27 supra.
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rules in favor of general trends or goals. She ignores completely
the majoritarian basis for constitutional rules, as is characteristic
of a result-oriented perspective that views law as competition for
the enforcement of particular policy measures by the sovereign-represented here by the judiciary. Typical of a purely
policy- or ends-oriented view that law entails only the vindication
of particular policy preferences without regard to theoretical or
institutional limitations, she ventures an opinion about the motives of those who question the desirable results achieved by the
courts, attributing their reservations to a resentment of minority
progress. Additionally, she transposes the consideration of the
results of particular judicial decisions into issues of competence
and power, 34 speaking as if the two were assumedly the same. 5
At the other pole from the school of thought followed by
Secretary Harris is an interesting minority position, represented
by the painfully blunt statements of Professor Raoul Berger concerning what he regards as the novel and constitutionally unjustified actions of the Supreme Court, particularly those under Earl
Warren. His controversial Government by Judiciary:The Trans-

formation of the FourteenthAmendment 6 provides an interesting
example of the same approach that is reflected in Mr. Berger's
essay.37 For Professor Berger, the discernable intent of the framers
34. Harris, supra note 25, at 489.
35. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 1, at 1150.
36. R. BERGER, supra note 1.
37. Interestingly, Professor Berger has characterized the vicissitudes of his own distinguished scholarly career partly in terms of how well the results pointed to by his
research suited the goal of a predominantly liberal scholarly community. Referring to his
argument in his book, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 1, that "the Court has exer-

cised a power that the Constitution withheld from it," Berger remarks:
Since I question, in that book, whether the Court is empowered to act as an
instrument of "revolution," I anticipated that academicians who were enamored
of the judicial results-never mind their legitimacy-would vigorously defend
the role of the Court. What was unexpected was the denigratory tone of their
rebuttals, a tone unworthy of scholarly discourse.
Berger, Academe v. the FoundingFathers,30 NAT'L REV. 468 (1978). The impact that the
political dynamics and forces of fashion have had upon the career of previous scholars has
been noted in the past, along with mention of the survival of opinions within the scholarly
apparatus. See, e.g., Wollan, Crosskey's Once and Future Constitution, 5 POL. ScI.
REVIEWER 129 (1975) (provides an excellent account of the reception of Crosskey's controversial POLITICS AND THE CONSTITurON IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953). As

Wollan notes, much of the reaction to Crosskey's thesis that the United States Supreme
Court was actually intended by the framers to be the nation's "supreme juridical
head"-a role curiously compatible with the pro-activist scholarship of recent years-was
vigorously critical but strangely light on any counter evidence to undermine or challenge
the thesis at any but a polemical level. See, e.g., Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial
Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1456 (1954).
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of any given constitutional provision governs judicial action and
can be modified only by a formal amendment." In this way he,
superficially at least, solves one of the more perplexing problems
of the realists by linking extension of constitutional principles of
a definite and limited content to the majoritarian process of ratification." The judicial commands are tied to these majority statements and must be justified by them. Professor Berger has almost
religious reverence for this Constitution as a guiding document."

His rather narrow and focused approach to giving that document
significance for current problems relies upon the will of the majority, as proved by historical evidence, for the content of constitutional rules, including those rules protecting minorities. He relatedly assumes that the Constitution has a limited meaning and is
addressed to particular problems.
The Berger and Harris essays have one thing in common-they both fail to articulate a viable judicial decisional technique or method to serve the chosen philosophical positions. Secretary Harris simply substitutes an impressionistic reaction to
the Constitution, which interprets these transcendent constitutional themes according to the bias of the observer, for Professor
Berger's admittedly insufficient method of settling the constitutional consent issue-namely, the assertion that the framers' intent is a useful, if not foolproof, generally applicable method of
keeping faith with the Constitution and democratic government.
But Professor Berger's approach also has serious and obvious
limitations. As Professor Ely has correctly observed
"constitutional provisions exist on a spectrum ranging from the
relatively specific to the extremely open textured,"' and in many
cases the legislative history or any other evidence of what was
"intended" for a currently litigated problem affected by the Constitution has serious shortcomings." It is consequently impossible
38. See Berger, supra note 37, at 468-69.
39. For a more general account of the accommodation of democratic theory within
the amendment process, see A. GRIMEs, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION (1978).
40. Berger, supra note 6, at 495-96.
41. Ely, supra note 21, at 413.
42. Id. at 433-34 nn. 128 & 129. See also Ely, Toward A Representation-Reinforcing
Mode of JudicialReview, 37 MD. L. REv. 451 (1978) (thorough discussion of Ely's theory
to accommodate judicial treatment of the more capacious constitutional provisions with
the overriding concern for democratic theory, which Ely has acknowledged as the "most
serious" problem with untethered or unlimited judicial authority. Ely, supra note 21, at
404.). One problem with Professor Ely's approach to this question, however, is that he
seems to proceed from an impression from a facial evaluation of the document about the
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to rely upon the framers' intent to serve our philosophical preferences for limited government based on democratic principals
when the intent is reasonably clear or evident for only some constitutional provisions. If it really is not clear, the insistence on its
use will merely cause de facto judicial discretion to employ the
trappings and terminology of interpretation based on "intent."
The two approaches are basically reflections of contrary responses to a much deeper and more fundamental question about
our constitutional policy: Does the Constitution guarantee to us
the supposed benefits flowing from unlimited experimentation by
some supreme policy-making arm of the central government, calculated to make us better off, or contrawise does it protect us
from exactly this form of experiment by insuring a permanent
severance of legislative, discretionary policy formulation on the
one hand and judicial authority on the other? In purely utilitarian
terms, which are also the principle touchstones of the "realist"
perspective, do we gain or lose from the policy initiatives of a
"frankly experimental" judiciary? Naturally for those who count
the democratic element of our Constitution in the calculation of
gain and loss, perhaps even above other empirically or impressionistically identified "results," the answer is clear at least at
the philosophical level. 3 The basic problem remains, however,
that this great issue of judicial authority is still one of the most
serious questions relating to our Constitution yet it receives very
little analytically refined discussion between these extremes. As
a bottom line, Professor Ely's observations suggest at least some
accommodation of practical limitations or judicial decisional
techniques in constitutional taw on the one hand, and our philosophical preferences on the other.
If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that
is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to
vagueness or "open-textured" quality of particular constitutional amendments, and then
does little to formulate solutions for the problems of meaning that plague the subject,
other than to relate his own plausible but personal reaction to the language of the Constitution. For a similar criticism of his handling of the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act,
see R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrEN, supra note 1, at 178 n.94, and generally, id. at 78-95. While
one may applaude Professor Ely's serious effort to work out a problem most simply ignore,
we should also perhaps be careful to avoid extrapolating plausible, internally consistent
theories from the face of the Constitution without more, lest the document become the
object of a tradition more befitting the civilian than the analyst of our fundamental
charter and the political heritage it symbolizes.
43. Ely, supra note 21, at 406.
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representative democracy, responsible commentators would
have to conclude, whatever the framers may have been assuming, that the courts should stay away from them. 4
Because the record of the Supreme Court in recent times
gives very little cause for optimism, the real question remains
whether or not this "principled approach" can he developed,
Lastly, scholars should give serious consideration to whether their
efforts ought to be directed at grappling with these important
issues of political philosophy rather than simply speaking out,
either for or against, the results of judicial activism in American
constitutional law.
44. Id. at 448. See also Ely, supra note 42.
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